Alan Gewirth's argument for human rights is made from the perspective (or from 'within the standpoint') of any agent A. The argument says the agent must accept in turn:
(1) I am an agent
(2) I have purposes
(3) In order to achieve my purposes in general I require freedom and well-being (or whatever the necessary conditions of achieving my purposes in general are)
(4) I have rights to freedom and well-being (= Others ought not to interfere with my freedom and well-being)
(5) 'I am an agent' is a sufficient reason for 'I have rights to freedom and well-being'
(6) Every agent has rights to freedom and well-being (= Others ought not to interfere with its freedom and well-being)
(7) I ought not to interfere with the freedom and well-being of any other agent
The 'ought' in (4) is an 'indirectly prudential ought'. A does not say that others ought not to interfere for the sake of achieving their own purposes (as in a normal prudential ought), but that they ought not to interfere for the sake of A achieving A's purposes. By contrast the 'ought' of (6) is a moral ought. So Gewirth in effect analyses moral oughts as 'generalised indirectly prudential oughts'.
The key questions are: what does (4) mean, and how does the argument from (1) to (4) work? In my 2008 critique of Gewirth's argument ('Protagonist and Subject in Gewirth's Argument for Human Rights') I concluded that A's accepting (4) must be interpreted as A's demanding, on the grounds that it needs freedom and well-being in order to act for any of its purposes, that others not interfere with its freedom and well-being. I then argued that on this interpretation (6) does not follow from (5). For (6) would only follow from (5) if the argument from (1) to (4) could be generalised to an argument showing that A had to conclude that any agent B had rights to freedom and well-being. But such a generalised version of the argument would be invalid.
The argument from (1) to (4) is essentially that since A cares about achieving its own purposes it is rationally compelled to demand that others not interfere with the freedom and well-being it requires in order to achieve those purposes. So the argument is essentially prudential: it goes from A's purposes to what A must do to achieve them. Therefore its validity depends on the person whose purposes, freedom and well-being are at stake (the 'subject' of the argument) being the very same person as person for whom the argument is supposed to be rationally compelling (the 'protagonist' of the argument). A must be both protagonist and subject of the argument for it to work.
By contrast a generalised version of the argument would have to go like this. For any agent B, A must accept:
(9) B is an agent
(10) B has purposes
(11) In order to achieve those purposes B requires freedom and well-being
(12) B has rights to freedom and well-being (= Others ought not to interfere with B's freedom and well-being)
In this argument while the protagonist is still A the subject is B. This argument fails because A does not necessarily care about B achieving its purposes and so is not rationally compelled to demand that others (including A) not interfere with the freedom and well-being B requires in order to achieve them, and that is what A's accepting (12) would amount to.
Of course we can generalise (1) to (4) to a valid argument showing that any agent B has to accept that B has rights to freedom and well-being. Here protagonist and subject would again be the same person. But that is not the kind of generalisation needed. (In Gewirth's terminology, it is 'judgmental' universalisation, whereas what is needed is 'possessive' universalisation.)
In short, the argument from (1) to (4) is 'identity-dependent'; its validity depends on the fact that its protagonist is the same person as its subject. Therefore it cannot be generalised to an argument with A as protagonist and other agents as subjects. Therefore (5) cannot be generalised to (6). We can concede that in virtue of the argument from (1) to (4) A must accept (5), as long as it means:
(5a) 'I am an agent' is a sufficient reason for me to have to demand that others not interfere with my freedom and well-being
But A can accept this without having to accept (6), i.e. without having to demand that others not interfere with the freedom and well-being of any agent. For the argument on which (5a) is grounded is identity-dependent: it only works for the case in which its subject is A, the protagonist of the argument.
Beyleveld's and Bos's 2009 response ('The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason in Gewirth's Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency') is that if the argument from (1) to (4) was essentially prudential then it would indeed be impossible to get from (5) to (6). But the argument is not essentially prudential. Rather it is 'dialectical'. For A is rationally compelled to accept (4) by virtue of accepting nothing more than (1), i.e. on pain of contradicting that A is an agent, and not as a means of achieving its ends. There is a prudential element to the argument from (1) to (4) but this is subsidiary. Accordingly the move from (5) to (6) is after all valid.
(NB Beyleveld and Bos's use of 'dialectical' seems to differ from Gewirth's original use. Gewirth called an argument dialectical if it proceeded from 'within the standpoint' of a particular agent, i.e. if it relied on that particular agent's assumptions and operated via inferences which that particular agent was rationally committed to drawing. In this broad sense of 'dialectical' the argument from (1) to (4) as I have interpreted it is dialectical.)
My response is that I do not see how the mere acknowledgement 'I am an agent' can rationally compel A to demand that others not interfere with its freedom and well-being via some interpretation of the argument from (1) to (4) without the argument relying on the assumption that the protagonist of the argument cares about purposes of its subject, and therefore without the argument remaining identity-dependent. Yet as long as the argument from (1) to (4) is identity-dependent then the move from (5) to (6) is illegitimate. The question is then whether Beyleveld and Bos's own restatement of the argument from (1) to (4) provides an interpretation of it that is not identity-dependent. If it does then we are in new territory. But I am not persuaded that it does.
Friday, 19 February 2010
Tuesday, 2 February 2010
Internal and external reasons
Bernard Williams's article 'Internal and external reasons' in his Moral Luck begins with a double definition of an internal reason:
(1) The sentence 'A has a reason to do X' asserts the existence of an internal reason if and only if it implies that there is some motive (i.e. desire, loyalty, disposition of evaluation etc.) M of A's which will be served by her doing X. Otherwise it asserts the existence of an external reason.
and
(2) The sentence 'A has a reason to do X' asserts the existence of an external reason if and only if the truth of the sentence depends on there being some motive M of A's which will be served by her doing X. Otherwise it asserts the existence of an external reason. (101)
Presumably we must interpret (2) as making it clear that the 'implies' in (1) is that of material implication, so the two definitions coincide. Williams goes on to present:
(3) 'A has a reason to do X' if and only if there is some desire D of A's which will be served by her doing X (101)
and to say that he will 'work it up into something more adequate' by 'addition and revision' (102). In fact the 'addition and revision' that follows (102-5) does not seem to alter (3) at all except in that it replaces 'desire' by 'motive', and with that replacement it becomes the claim that all reasons are internal reasons by teh above definition. For all that Williams does in these pages is clarify that what matters is that A's doing X will in fact serve some motive M, rather than whether A thinks it will, and describe some deliberative processes through which A might discover what reasons to act she has.
At one point he says that such deliberative processes might give A new desires and new reasons to act (104-5). His meaning is obscure but the idea seems to be that if, for example, I want an entertaining evening and come to the view that going to the opera would make for an entertaining evening, then this will give me a desire to go to the opera. Since buying opera tickets will serve that desire I now have a reason to buy opera tickets. But is this really a case of a creating a new reason? Surely if it was the case from the start that I wanted an entertaining evening, and going to the opera would make for an entertaining evening, then I had a reason from the start to buy opera tickets. I just hadn't seen that I had a reason to. And even if my deliberative process does create a new reason, as opposed to revealing an existing one, this does not affect the truth of (3).
Therefore it seems that by the time we get to Williams' argument against external reasons his position is simply a slightly weakened version of (3), namely:
(4) 'A has a reason to do X' only if there is some motive M of A's which will be served by her doing X.
This is just the view that all reasons are internal reasons. Why does Williams think there is something incoherent about external reasons? His argument seems to go:
(5.1) If P is a reason for A to do X then it could be a reason for which A does X on a particular occasion, and it would then help explain why A did X (106). That is, P (or the belief that P) could provide part of the motivation for A's doing X (could be a motivating reason for A's doing X).
(5.2) The only way this could happen with an external reason is through A coming to believe that P is a reason for A to do X. (107)
(5.3) Furthermore A would have to come to believe that P is a reason for A to do X as a result of deliberating rationally. (109)
(5.4) Furthermore A would have to come to be motivated to do X just as a result of acquiring this belief. (109)
(5.5) But 'I see no reason to suppose that these conditions could possibly be met.' (109)
No doubt an external reasons theorist could deny (5.3) on the grounds that the route to coming to see that P is a reason for A to do X need not itself be a rational route; it might be some process of 'awakening'. But even if (5.3) is omitted the argument looks quite strong. For (5.2) and (5.4) seem to offer the most plausible way that (5.1) could be true for an external reason (at least the onus is on the external reasons theorist to offer an alternative). And (5.4) contradicts the very plausible belief-desire theory of motivation. This is probably what is behind (5.5), given Williams's earlier reference to Hume's assertion that reason - by which Hume means the faculty of discovering truths - cannot by itself motivate (108). So it looks as if an external reasons theorist needs to deny belief-desire theory.
But I think there is a way of denying Williams' conclusion without abandoning belief-desire theory. For what is the basis of (5.1)? In later writings, Williams says it is that unless (5.1) is true the practice of offering reasons for action to each other would be pointless. (This echoes one of Hume's arguments for 'moral internalism', the claim that to have a moral belief is to be somewhat motivated to act on it: if it were not, Hume says, what would be the point of arguing about morality with each other?) But this seems to assume that either (5.1) is true for everyone or it is true for no-one. Surely all we need to ensure that the practice of offering reasons for action to each other has a point is something weaker than (5.1), such as:
(5.1a) If P is a reason for A to do X, it could be a reason for which A does X on a particular occasion, and it would then help explain why A did X, as long as A is motivationally normal.
For it is to, and about, motivationally normal people that we make the vast majority of our assertions about reasons for action. For a motivationally normal agent A (for example, with a some minimum capacity to identify with the pains and pleasures of others), it follows by the belief-desire theory and Williams' argument (or something like it) that all the reasons for A to act are internal. But if someone is sufficiently motivationally abnormal ( for example, if they completely lack this capacity) then it doesn't follow. All that would follow in general is:
(4a) 'A has a reason to do X' only if there is some motive M which A would have if she were motivationally normal, which will be served by her doing X.
On this 'normal-agent internalist' view of reasons for action, when we assert that A has a reason for action we tacitly treat her as motivationally normal. If it turns out that she is not, to the point where she has no motive which will be served by doing X, we do not conclude that has no reason to do X, only that she is incapable of doing what she has reason to do. So in this case we assert an external reason. But (4a) still holds of this assertion. The link between reasons for action and motivation is at the level of what is socially (or humanly) normal, and it is at this level that all reasons are internal.
(Revised 3 February 2010)
(1) The sentence 'A has a reason to do X' asserts the existence of an internal reason if and only if it implies that there is some motive (i.e. desire, loyalty, disposition of evaluation etc.) M of A's which will be served by her doing X. Otherwise it asserts the existence of an external reason.
and
(2) The sentence 'A has a reason to do X' asserts the existence of an external reason if and only if the truth of the sentence depends on there being some motive M of A's which will be served by her doing X. Otherwise it asserts the existence of an external reason. (101)
Presumably we must interpret (2) as making it clear that the 'implies' in (1) is that of material implication, so the two definitions coincide. Williams goes on to present:
(3) 'A has a reason to do X' if and only if there is some desire D of A's which will be served by her doing X (101)
and to say that he will 'work it up into something more adequate' by 'addition and revision' (102). In fact the 'addition and revision' that follows (102-5) does not seem to alter (3) at all except in that it replaces 'desire' by 'motive', and with that replacement it becomes the claim that all reasons are internal reasons by teh above definition. For all that Williams does in these pages is clarify that what matters is that A's doing X will in fact serve some motive M, rather than whether A thinks it will, and describe some deliberative processes through which A might discover what reasons to act she has.
At one point he says that such deliberative processes might give A new desires and new reasons to act (104-5). His meaning is obscure but the idea seems to be that if, for example, I want an entertaining evening and come to the view that going to the opera would make for an entertaining evening, then this will give me a desire to go to the opera. Since buying opera tickets will serve that desire I now have a reason to buy opera tickets. But is this really a case of a creating a new reason? Surely if it was the case from the start that I wanted an entertaining evening, and going to the opera would make for an entertaining evening, then I had a reason from the start to buy opera tickets. I just hadn't seen that I had a reason to. And even if my deliberative process does create a new reason, as opposed to revealing an existing one, this does not affect the truth of (3).
Therefore it seems that by the time we get to Williams' argument against external reasons his position is simply a slightly weakened version of (3), namely:
(4) 'A has a reason to do X' only if there is some motive M of A's which will be served by her doing X.
This is just the view that all reasons are internal reasons. Why does Williams think there is something incoherent about external reasons? His argument seems to go:
(5.1) If P is a reason for A to do X then it could be a reason for which A does X on a particular occasion, and it would then help explain why A did X (106). That is, P (or the belief that P) could provide part of the motivation for A's doing X (could be a motivating reason for A's doing X).
(5.2) The only way this could happen with an external reason is through A coming to believe that P is a reason for A to do X. (107)
(5.3) Furthermore A would have to come to believe that P is a reason for A to do X as a result of deliberating rationally. (109)
(5.4) Furthermore A would have to come to be motivated to do X just as a result of acquiring this belief. (109)
(5.5) But 'I see no reason to suppose that these conditions could possibly be met.' (109)
No doubt an external reasons theorist could deny (5.3) on the grounds that the route to coming to see that P is a reason for A to do X need not itself be a rational route; it might be some process of 'awakening'. But even if (5.3) is omitted the argument looks quite strong. For (5.2) and (5.4) seem to offer the most plausible way that (5.1) could be true for an external reason (at least the onus is on the external reasons theorist to offer an alternative). And (5.4) contradicts the very plausible belief-desire theory of motivation. This is probably what is behind (5.5), given Williams's earlier reference to Hume's assertion that reason - by which Hume means the faculty of discovering truths - cannot by itself motivate (108). So it looks as if an external reasons theorist needs to deny belief-desire theory.
But I think there is a way of denying Williams' conclusion without abandoning belief-desire theory. For what is the basis of (5.1)? In later writings, Williams says it is that unless (5.1) is true the practice of offering reasons for action to each other would be pointless. (This echoes one of Hume's arguments for 'moral internalism', the claim that to have a moral belief is to be somewhat motivated to act on it: if it were not, Hume says, what would be the point of arguing about morality with each other?) But this seems to assume that either (5.1) is true for everyone or it is true for no-one. Surely all we need to ensure that the practice of offering reasons for action to each other has a point is something weaker than (5.1), such as:
(5.1a) If P is a reason for A to do X, it could be a reason for which A does X on a particular occasion, and it would then help explain why A did X, as long as A is motivationally normal.
For it is to, and about, motivationally normal people that we make the vast majority of our assertions about reasons for action. For a motivationally normal agent A (for example, with a some minimum capacity to identify with the pains and pleasures of others), it follows by the belief-desire theory and Williams' argument (or something like it) that all the reasons for A to act are internal. But if someone is sufficiently motivationally abnormal ( for example, if they completely lack this capacity) then it doesn't follow. All that would follow in general is:
(4a) 'A has a reason to do X' only if there is some motive M which A would have if she were motivationally normal, which will be served by her doing X.
On this 'normal-agent internalist' view of reasons for action, when we assert that A has a reason for action we tacitly treat her as motivationally normal. If it turns out that she is not, to the point where she has no motive which will be served by doing X, we do not conclude that has no reason to do X, only that she is incapable of doing what she has reason to do. So in this case we assert an external reason. But (4a) still holds of this assertion. The link between reasons for action and motivation is at the level of what is socially (or humanly) normal, and it is at this level that all reasons are internal.
(Revised 3 February 2010)
Thursday, 28 January 2010
Why is self-consciousness desire?
This is about the transition from self-consciousness to desire in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The German text (unfortunately without italics) is here. Where I quote from the English I give the first few words of the German passage afterwards so you can locate it if you want to. There is a good German-English dictionary here.
First of all, what does Hegel mean by self-consciousness?
At para 164 (Miller edition) he says that:
it is a distinguishing of that which contains no difference, or self-consciousness. I distinguish myself from myself, and in doing so I am directly aware that what is distinguished from myself is not different [from me]. I, the selfsame being, repel myself from myself; but what is posited as distinct from me, or as unlike me, is immediately, in being so distinguished, not a distinction for me. It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth was a Thing, an ‘other’ than themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes.
es ist Unterscheiden des Ununterschiedenen, oder Selbstbewußtsein ...
At 166 he repeats the point:
In this there is indeed an otherness; that is to say, consciousness makes a distinction [between itself and its object - AC], but one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction.
Es ist darin zwar auch ein Anderssein ...
So self-consciousness as Hegel understands it is a standpoint, or 'configuration of consciousness', in which I conceive my object, i.e. that which is not-me, as myself. So it is contradictory. There is a contradiction between difference (the object is not me) and identity (the object it is me). He explicitly introduces desire as a solution to this contradiction at 167:
Hence otherness is for it [i.e. for the subject who occupies the standpoint of self-consciousness - AC] in the form of a being, or as a distinct moment; but there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness [i.e. the standpoints discussed in chapters 1-3 - AC], and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the second moment, the unity [Einheit = oneness] of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which, however, is only appearance, or a difference which, in itself, is no difference [kein Sein hat = has no being].
Es ist hiemit für es das Anderssein, als ein Sein ...
I take it that 'the unity of self-consciousness with itself' means the identity of the self-conscious subject with its object. So the same contradiction is being restated. The subject is driven to resolve the contradiction by coming to see the object as distinct from itself in appearance but identical to it in essence.
The same passage continues:
This antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general. Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth [nunmehr = henceforth or now] has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is present [vorhanden = existent] in the first instance only as opposed to the first object.
This is obscure but my reading is that that desire is the subject's effort to resolve the contradiction between difference and identity in favour of the latter, i.e. to render the object thoroughly identical to the subject. The object is seen as double: in its appearance it is distinct from the subject but in its essence it is identical to the subject. So the appearance is 'negative': it is not what the object really is (for really the object is identical to the subject). In desire the subject aims to do away with the appearance and reduce the object to the subject.
At 174 he says something a bit different:
self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner.
das Selbstbewußtsein hiemit seiner selbst nur gewiß, durch das Aufheben ...
(By the way the claim that the object of desire must be a living organism has been introduced at 168. I'll pass over this.)
Here what he says is that subject was certain that the object was 'nothing', i.e. was not genuinely distinct from itself , but by destroying the object it shows itself that this is the case. Previously the subject was 'certain of itself' (or 'self-certain'). Hegel uses this term to mean to refer to the initial stage of self-consciousness. So it just means that the subject conceived its object as itself. But now this certainty has become 'true' or 'explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner'. In other words it has shown itself that its object is identical to itself.
The difference is that in 167 desire is portrayed as an effort to make the object identical to the subject, but in 174 desire it is portrayed as an effort to prove that the object is essentially identical to the subject. The first formulation seems to carry over to his later writings (the Philosophical Propadeutic and the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind).
First of all, what does Hegel mean by self-consciousness?
At para 164 (Miller edition) he says that:
it is a distinguishing of that which contains no difference, or self-consciousness. I distinguish myself from myself, and in doing so I am directly aware that what is distinguished from myself is not different [from me]. I, the selfsame being, repel myself from myself; but what is posited as distinct from me, or as unlike me, is immediately, in being so distinguished, not a distinction for me. It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth was a Thing, an ‘other’ than themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes.
es ist Unterscheiden des Ununterschiedenen, oder Selbstbewußtsein ...
At 166 he repeats the point:
In this there is indeed an otherness; that is to say, consciousness makes a distinction [between itself and its object - AC], but one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction.
Es ist darin zwar auch ein Anderssein ...
So self-consciousness as Hegel understands it is a standpoint, or 'configuration of consciousness', in which I conceive my object, i.e. that which is not-me, as myself. So it is contradictory. There is a contradiction between difference (the object is not me) and identity (the object it is me). He explicitly introduces desire as a solution to this contradiction at 167:
Hence otherness is for it [i.e. for the subject who occupies the standpoint of self-consciousness - AC] in the form of a being, or as a distinct moment; but there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness [i.e. the standpoints discussed in chapters 1-3 - AC], and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the second moment, the unity [Einheit = oneness] of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which, however, is only appearance, or a difference which, in itself, is no difference [kein Sein hat = has no being].
Es ist hiemit für es das Anderssein, als ein Sein ...
I take it that 'the unity of self-consciousness with itself' means the identity of the self-conscious subject with its object. So the same contradiction is being restated. The subject is driven to resolve the contradiction by coming to see the object as distinct from itself in appearance but identical to it in essence.
The same passage continues:
This antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general. Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth [nunmehr = henceforth or now] has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is present [vorhanden = existent] in the first instance only as opposed to the first object.
This is obscure but my reading is that that desire is the subject's effort to resolve the contradiction between difference and identity in favour of the latter, i.e. to render the object thoroughly identical to the subject. The object is seen as double: in its appearance it is distinct from the subject but in its essence it is identical to the subject. So the appearance is 'negative': it is not what the object really is (for really the object is identical to the subject). In desire the subject aims to do away with the appearance and reduce the object to the subject.
At 174 he says something a bit different:
self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner.
das Selbstbewußtsein hiemit seiner selbst nur gewiß, durch das Aufheben ...
(By the way the claim that the object of desire must be a living organism has been introduced at 168. I'll pass over this.)
Here what he says is that subject was certain that the object was 'nothing', i.e. was not genuinely distinct from itself , but by destroying the object it shows itself that this is the case. Previously the subject was 'certain of itself' (or 'self-certain'). Hegel uses this term to mean to refer to the initial stage of self-consciousness. So it just means that the subject conceived its object as itself. But now this certainty has become 'true' or 'explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner'. In other words it has shown itself that its object is identical to itself.
The difference is that in 167 desire is portrayed as an effort to make the object identical to the subject, but in 174 desire it is portrayed as an effort to prove that the object is essentially identical to the subject. The first formulation seems to carry over to his later writings (the Philosophical Propadeutic and the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind).
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